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Abstract 
This paper studies how individual social status influences bilateral 
bargaining in small-scale societies where resources are scarce. It 
reports the results of a field lab experiment with members of 
irrigation schemes who participate either as water distributors or 
receivers. Our results indicate that social status influences 
bargaining behavior in two ways. First, with social status being 
positively correlated with economic wealth, our results confirm a self-
serving bias in fairness conceptions. Second, social status influences 
how receivers react to the received share as well as how distributors 
adapt their distributive decisions after the receivers’ reaction. We 
also highlight implications of the results for the efficient use of scarce 
resources. 
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1. Introduction 
How do individuals in developing countries bargain over the limited resources they have 
at their disposal? When does it lead to open conflict, efficiency losses and possibly persistent 
poverty? Thanks to the increasing use of experimental methods, economists now have 
substantial empirical knowledge about bargaining behavior.1
The settings people in developing countries are confronted with, however, differ in at 
least two important ways from the ones simulated in this bargaining literature. First, resources 
are scarce, in a sense that they are often insufficient for all people to reach a minimum critical 
production input, which condemns (at least) part of the population to persistent low income 
levels. Second, most people in developing countries live in close-knit small societies where 
elements of social status, defined as one’s position in the social hierarchy, are crucial in 
determining social and economic interaction. 
 There is ample evidence on the 
conditions under which people not only care about their own material well-being but also take 
the well-being of others into account. We also know a lot on the conditions that influence the 
likelihood of conflict within a bargaining setting (for surveys see, e.g., Camerer, 2003, 
Cooper and Kagel, 2010). 
In this paper, we will implement an experiment explicitly designed to test bargaining 
models appropriate for these settings; that is, they account for resource scarcity and the 
importance of individual social status in small-scale communities. To do so, we select a 
population that faces recurrent and intense resource scarcity and needs to engage in bilateral 
bargaining over the distribution of scarce resources. An interesting such population are small 
farmers in rural Tanzania who depend on self-governed irrigation schemes for water access, 
hence their production and income. They are used to a situation where users upstream in the 
irrigation scheme make appropriation decisions about the water flow, and are often confronted 
with dropping water levels because upstream users cut off water channels. Moreover, in the 
dry season water in irrigation schemes becomes scarce, in a sense that it is technically 
impossible to give all irrigation users a water share that guarantees a decent production and 
income. 
                                                   
1 In economic experiments, a randomly selected pool of participants interacts with each other in a controlled 
environment, receiving real incentives through financial payments that depend on their pay-offs in the 
experimental game. These pay-offs depend on their individual decisions and the decisions of the other 
participants they interact with. In this way, one is able to study how changes in incentive structures as well as 
real-life socio-economic characteristics affect individual behavior and social interaction. Experimental methods 
have been very useful for the empirical testing of bargaining models (Kagel and Roth, 1995). 
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A sample of this population is grouped in pairs to interact anonymously in a repeated 
bargaining experiment. To study the influence of social status on bilateral bargaining we rely 
on the natural heterogeneity within the sample. As pay-offs in the experimental game are the 
same for all participants and participants remain anonymous during the experiment, 
behavioral differences in the experiment can only be attributed to non-payoff asymmetries, 
such as heterogeneity in social status. 
To analyze the data we make use of dynamic panel data models that allow us to control 
for state dependence, the interaction between the decisions of distributors and receivers, and 
the influence of their social status. By doing so, this article makes an important contribution 
to the analysis of bilateral bargaining. Most repeated bargaining experiments produce rich 
dynamic data, but the dynamics are often only superficially analyzed. We will show that a 
dynamic analysis can provide a more complete understanding of the influence of social status 
in a repeated bargaining setting. 
By following this approach, this study produces evidence that individual social status 
plays an important role in the bargaining over scarce resources. We find that at least part of 
the influence of social status works through self-serving biases in fairness norms, which is 
consistent with previous experiments (Kagel et al., 1996). Whereas distributors with high 
social status (who generally face better economic conditions) have a tendency to share 
resources equally, distributors with lower social status aim at receiving higher than equal 
shares to correct for initial unequal conditions. We also find evidence in support of strategic 
considerations. Many distributors keep higher than equal shares but when punished by the 
receiver switch to equal split or even altruistic distributions. Finally, we observe a tendency 
for distributors to rotate as to who receives a share above the production threshold. This is an 
important observation as such rotation makes it possible to reconcile efficiency considerations 
with sharing norms that support equal sharing 
In general, our results provide a more nuanced picture on sharing in Sub-Saharan African 
societies than most commonly presented in the literature, where sharing norms have been 
considered as strong (e.g., Platteau, 2000) and accepted by all socio-economic sectors, as 
suggested by experimental bargaining studies who did not detect any correlation between 
individual socio-economic characteristics and bargaining behavior (Henrich et al., 2001). Our 
study demonstrates that under conditions of scarcity, deviation from equal sharing is very 
common, which can be rationalized through biases in fairness considerations, strategic play 
and efficiency considerations, that are related to heterogeneity in social status. 
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2. The influence of socio-economic heterogeneity on bargaining 
The study of bargaining behavior has a long tradition in economics, and game theory in 
particular (see for instance, Binmore and Dasgupta, 1987, for a review of modern bargaining 
theory in historical perspective). Thanks to the use of experimental methods bargaining 
models have been increasingly tested empirically. An important experimental game that has 
been used intensively to study bargaining processes is the ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982). 
In this game, one player (the proposer) receives a fixed amount of money that she has to 
distribute between herself and another player, the respondent. The respondent can accept or 
reject the proposal, but if he rejects it, both players receive nothing. Assuming (common 
knowledge of) narrow material self-interest, there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium. As 
punishment is costly for the respondent he would always refrain from rejecting the offer made 
by the proposer. Consequently, the proposer, anticipating this, will keep most if not all of the 
resources in order to maximize her pay-off. Such equilibrium, however, has been consistently 
refuted by numerous ultimatum game experiments, where the mean of the proposals is around 
40% of the available amount and the mode is the equal split. At the same time, most offers of 
less than 20% are rejected by the responder (Camerer and Thaler, 1995). 
These results have stimulated a lively and ongoing debate about the predictive role of 
game theory and more specifically about how theoretical models need to be adapted to 
rationalize the observed behavior. New utility models have been elaborated that account for 
both strategic play and fairness considerations through inequity aversion (e.g., Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and reciprocal fairness (e.g., Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). 
The ultimatum game has been implemented with numerous variations; many of them to 
test this new generation of utility models. The most interesting for the purpose of this paper 
are those that have looked at the effect of socio-economic heterogeneity on bargaining 
behavior. Heterogeneity in ultimatum games has been modeled through differences in payoff 
conversion rates (Kagel et al., 1996; Schmitt, 2004), differences in outside options (Knez and 
Camerer, 1995; Schmitt, 2004), differences in endowments (Armantier, 2006; D’Exelle and 
Riedl, 2008) or through framing (Ball and Eckel, 1998). Summarizing the main findings of 
these experimental studies, introducing socio-economic heterogeneity in a bargaining setting 
may have at least two important consequences. 
First, it may translate into a self-serving bias in the application of conceptions of fairness. 
Social psychologists have indicated that people have a psychological self-serving bias when 
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interpreting the fairness of a particular situation (Babcock et al., 1995). Neale and Bazerman 
(1992: 162) state that: “the selection of an allocation norm is often instrumentally motivated - 
the individual will choose a particular norm that maximizes his or her portion of the valued 
resource.” One such bias may be created by the wealth of the parties involved. That such self-
serving bias may be present within a bilateral bargaining setting has been confirmed by the 
study of Kagel et al. (1996). In a repeated ultimatum game they introduced inequality through 
the use of chips with different conversion rates. They observed that when the respondent had 
the higher conversion rate, the money was equally shared. When the proposer had the higher 
conversion rate, however, the chips were equally distributed leading to very unequal sharing 
in money terms.2
Second, socio-economic heterogeneity may also translate into differences in bargaining 
power. This has been demonstrated by Schmitt (2004) who in a repeated ultimatum game 
found that offers are more often rejected when responders have an outside option and that 
proposers strategically make higher offers accordingly. People with outside options have a 
better fallback position (or threat point) which is assumed to positively correlate with the 
amount of power they can bring to the bargaining process. Armantier (2006) introduced 
inequality in a repeated ultimatum game experiment through endowment inequality, and 
found that over time rich subjects demand more whereas poor subjects increasingly accept 
this. D’Exelle and Riedl (2008) similarly found in a repeated distribution game with 
endowment inequality that proposers demand more only after being punished by the 
responders. Ball and Eckel (1998), who artificially introduced social status in ultimatum 
games by randomly assigning participants a label of high or low social status, which is 
publicly known, found that the generosity of both high and low social status proposers 
increases with the social status of the respondent. This suggests that people expect high social 
status respondents to demand more and therefore give them higher shares to avoid rejection. 
 
Most of these experiments relied on college students in developed countries. Because of 
the limited socio-economic heterogeneity in this population, heterogeneity had to be 
introduced in an artificial way, through asymmetries in the pay-off structure or through 
framing. It is, however, not clear whether the results observed in the student lab will be 
replicated with people outside the lab, where socio-economic heterogeneity is considerably 
larger. As with people outside the lab there is no need to artificially introduce socio-economic 
                                                   
2 For a theoretical model that rationalizes people’s behavior of deviating from an assumed objective fairness 
concept in a direction that favors them, see Konow (2000). 
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heterogeneity, it is crucial that socio-economic heterogeneity is spontaneously brought into 
the game by the participants themselves. It seems that in populations where real-life socio-
economic heterogeneity is substantial this is indeed the case. This is even the more so among 
participants who tend to interact with each other outside the lab in daily life as well (Cardenas 
and Ostrom, 2004). Cardenas (2003), for instance, observed a strong correlation between real 
life economic heterogeneity and contributions in a public goods experiment with Colombian 
peasants, although socio-economic heterogeneity does not have any (marginal) pecuniary 
costs or benefits in his game. In particular, participants’ real wealth and inequality reduced 
cooperation, but only so when face-to-face communication was allowed. He suggests that the 
lower cooperation among more heterogeneous groups is partly due to less direct 
communication among the participants. 
In our study, we will show that even where people do not have any face-to-face contact, real-
life social status and differences in it may lead to strong behavioral differences in a bargaining 
setting. To study the influence of social status on bargaining behavior we bring a group of 
people heterogeneous on social status to the field lab and let them participate in an 
anonymous bargaining experiment. As pay-offs are constant for all participants, only non-
payoff asymmetries can explain behavioral differences in the experiment, such as 
heterogeneity in social status. 
An additional contribution of our study to the bargaining literature relates to the 
simulation of scarcity. We simulate scarcity by making use of a production threshold. In a 
first treatment the threshold is low enough for both players to be reached with the available 
resources, whereas in a second treatment the available resources are not enough for both to 
reach the threshold. Up to our knowledge, no studies have investigated bilateral bargaining in 
a setting characterized by resource scarcity. 
3. A field experiment to study bargaining over scarce water access 
The experiment aims to reproduce the actual incentives that the participants face in their 
daily life when they bargain over access to an irrigation water flow. The participants are used 
to a situation where users upstream in the irrigation scheme make appropriation decisions 
about the water flow. They are often confronted with dropping water levels because upstream 
users overuse or even cut off water channels. In such occasion, downstream users try to force 
upstream users to reconsider and adapt their distribution decisions. 
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3.1. Experimental design: the pay-offs 
The participants in the experiment are randomly assigned the role of upstream or 
downstream (water) user. Anonymous pairs of upstream and downstream users are formed, 
which remain fixed for the entire exercise. The experiment consists of several rounds. In each 
round, the upstream user takes as much water as she wants from a constant water flow, and 
what is left flows to the downstream user. More specifically, the upstream user decides how 
many hours in a day (of a maximum of 12 hours) to take water from the irrigation canal. 
While the upstream user taps water, there is assumed to flow no water to the downstream 
user. There is a direct relation between water use and income, represented by the production 
function in Table 1. As irrigation-dependent production requires a critical water input, this 
production function is characterized by a threshold. This represents a minimum water 
condition below which production is equal to a low level irrespective of the exact water input. 
In addition, above this critical water input, production shows decreasing marginal returns. 
 
Table 1. Production function 
 Water abundance Water scarcity 
Hours upstream user upstream downstream upstream downstream 
     
     
0 50 500 50 350 
1 50 500 50 325 
2 50 475 50 300 
3 50 450 50 250 
4 175 425 50 200 
5 250 375 50 125 
6 325 325 50 50 
7 375 250 125 50 
8 425 175 200 50 
9 450 50 250 50 
10 475 50 300 50 
11 500 50 325 50 
12 500 50 350 50 
     
Note. Pay-offs are measured in Tanzanian Shilling (TSH), with 1 US$ = 1200 TSH. 
 
In the water scarcity treatment, the water flow is reduced (approximately half as large as 
in the abundance treatment), so that more hours are needed to reach the minimum production 
threshold. At the same time, beyond this threshold, declines in marginal returns are less 
drastic with increasing number of hours of water use. Parameters are so that, in the abundance 
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treatment, total water availability is sufficient for both water users to reach the minimum 
water input, whereas in the scarcity treatment, total water availability is insufficient for both 
users to reach this threshold. 
After each decision made by the upstream user, the downstream user can react in one of 
the following ways. First, he can make use of a mediator who punishes the upstream water 
user. The cost of relying on the mediator is 30 TSH (Tanzanian Shilling) for the downstream 
user, whereas it reduces the payoff of the upstream user by 100 TSH. Second, if not using this 
punishment option, he leaves individual pay offs unaffected and he can choose between one 
of the following communication options: to communicate satisfaction, to communicate 
dissatisfaction or to communicate nothing (and thus not to react at all).3 The distribution game 
is repeated during five rounds in the abundance treatment and ten rounds in the scarcity 
treatment.4
Assuming (common knowledge of) narrow material self-interest, the only pure strategy 
equilibrium of our distribution game is the following. As punishment is costly for both water 
users, a downstream user would always refrain from punishing the upstream user irrespective 
of the distribution. Consequently, the upstream user, anticipating this, will appropriate as 
much water as to maximize her pay-off (i.e. at least 11 hours in the abundance treatment and 
12 hours in the scarcity treatment). However, as the bulk of ultimatum game experiments 
have consistently refuted the assumption of narrow material self-interest we do not expect 
such equilibrium to hold in our game either; and we expect that also in our distribution game 
experiment many participants, if not the majority, will opt for equal sharing.
 The participants did not know in advance the number of rounds in each treatment. 
More detailed experimental procedures and the instructions can be found in Appendix A. 
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In the scarcity treatment, water levels are insufficient for both water users to reach the 
critical water input. Proposing the equal split therefore comes with large foregone efficiency 
gains. In other words, equal sharing conflicts with efficiency in the one-shot version of this 
  
                                                   
3 Note that the punishment option is not framed as direct punishment, which would be a too intrusive 
instrument in these societies. Instead, downstream users are told they can rely on a local mediator who would 
then punish the upstream user. Moreover, as in these societies people often rely on less conflictive reaction 
options, we included three non-punishment reaction options, which allows us to study more subtle and realistic 
behavioral patterns. 
4 We followed this sequence of treatments for the following two reasons. First, we argue that it is only after 
playing an abundance treatment (where resources are sufficient for everyone to reach the production threshold) 
that the participants will consider the pay-off structure in the scarcity treatment as simulating resource scarcity. 
Second, the five rounds of the abundance treatment can be considered as trial rounds, as they will not be used in 
the analysis. 
5 This may be even more the case in Tanzania, where the socialist project of President Nyerere (1964-1985) 
has put a lot of emphasis on an egalitarian society and possibly solidified egalitarian sharing norms (see also 
Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln, 2005 on the influence of communism on social preferences). 
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game. Yet, thanks to the repeated character of the distribution game, rotation as to whom 
receives a share above the critical water input, may again equalize the returns over time. By 
elevating the received water for one of the irrigation users above the minimum threshold, such 
strategy may lead to substantial efficiency gains.6
3.2. The behavioral influence of social status 
 
We now elaborate on the possible behavioral influence of social status in our bargaining 
experiment. Social status in African societies is closely related to economic conditions, but it 
is more than that. It can best be understood as the honor or prestige attached to one’s social 
position, that is the position one occupies within a vertical social hierarchy in a society (Weiss 
and Fershtman, 1998). It translates into one’s ability to attain what one wants, to influence 
others and to be respected.7
From the review of the experimental bargaining literature above we expect that social 
status influences individual strategy choice in our bargaining game in the following ways. 
First, heterogeneity in social status may translate into different degrees of bargaining power 
and conflict aversion. In particular, people with lower (higher) social status have lower 
(higher) bargaining power. According to the psychological literature there is a direct inverse 
relation between power and conflict aversion. Less powerful people display more behavioral 
inhibition because they have fewer resources and are more dependent on others, whereas 
more powerful people have more capacity to behave according to their internal states (Keltner 
et al., 2003). In small-scale societies we expect this relation between social status, bargaining 
power and conflict aversion to be even stronger, as outside options are much more limited in 
comparison with Western societies, leading to higher levels of dependency. Second, with 
 So, it is not only indirectly linked to power through its correlation 
with economic conditions, but also in a direct way. 
                                                   
6 It should be noted that even after taking account of possible punishment costs such rotation strategy 
remains superior. To show this, imagine the smallest possible rotation (7 hours to upstream user in one round, 7 
hours to downstream user in another round), which leads to an efficiency gain of 2 x 75 TSH relative to the equal 
split strategy. When the upstream user is punished (we assume this is only realistic if she has more than 6 hours 
water access), this leads to a social efficiency loss of 130 TSH being the result of a 100 TSH cost for the 
upstream user and 30 TSH for the downstream user, which is lower than the efficiency gain of 150 TSH of the 
rotation strategy relative to the equal split. 
7 Although social status and economic wealth are closely related, heterogeneity on social status tends to be 
larger than economic differentiation in African societies. This is an additional argument in favor of focusing on 
social status instead of economic wealth. 
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social status being positively correlated with economic conditions, heterogeneity in social 
status may also lead to biases in fairness considerations.8
In summary, we expect social status to result in two behavioral forces related to 
differences in bargaining power and fairness conceptions. People with lower social status may 
bring less bargaining power into the game but at the same time have fairness conceptions that 
make them claim higher than equal shares. People with high social status, in contrast, can 
bring more bargaining power into the game but will not claim higher than equal shares. The 
strategy choices of upstream and downstream users will therefore depend on the balance of 
both forces. As upstream users have considerable bargaining power anyway (due to the first 
mover advantage), we expect that possible differences in strategy choice between upstream 
users of different social status are less the result of differences in power than of biases in 
fairness conceptions. As a result, we expect that social status influences the upstream user’s 
strategy choice as stated in the following hypothesis. 
 
H1:  Upstream users with high social status have a tendency to share resources equally, 
whereas upstream users with low social status aim at keeping higher than equal shares. 
For the strategy choice of downstream users, in contrast, differences in power/conflict 
aversion may be more decisive and even outweigh the influence of biases in fairness 
conceptions. This leads to our second hypothesis regarding downstream users’ reaction 
behavior: 
H2:  Downstream users with low social status are more reluctant to protest against the offers 
made by upstream users, compared to downstream users with high social status. 
Before moving to the empirical section, it is important to extend on the possible influence 
of resource scarcity in our distribution game, as this is an important feature that makes our 
distribution game different from traditional ultimatum games. Because of the production 
threshold, strategy choice may be influenced by efficiency considerations in addition to 
fairness considerations. There are empirical indications that in addition to (in)equality people 
                                                   
8 It should be noted that, while the participants in our experiment do not know the social status of their 
opponent (as they do not know whom they are matched with), they are able to make inferences about it. For 
example, if they have a low social status, they are in equal or worse conditions than their opponent, whereas if 
they have a high social status they are in equal or better conditions than their opponent. One could of course 
directly reveal information on the social status of the participants’ opponents. However, it is likely that this 
would lead to an experimenter demand effect (Zizzo, forthcoming). Our approach, in contrast, is conservative as 
it leads to an underestimation of the influence of social status.  
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pay attention to efficiency when making distributive decisions (see e.g. Engelman and 
Strobel, 2004; Güth et al., 2009). While efficiency considerations are often not strong enough 
to outweigh fairness considerations, it is plausible that they interact with the latter. In 
particular, upstream users with lower social status may be supported in their aim to receive 
higher than equal shares (hypothesis H1) by the fact that such unequal distributions are also 
good for efficiency. For upstream users with high social status, who prefer to share resources 
equally, efficiency considerations may stimulate them to rotate as to who receives a share 
above the threshold (i.e. more than the equal split). Whereas equal sharing conflicts with 
efficiency in the one-shot version of our distribution game, such rotation makes it possible to 
reconcile equal sharing and efficiency in a repeated setting. 
To measure real-life social status of the participants, we visited each of the irrigation 
schemes in the selected villages a few weeks before the actual experiment. During this visit, 
we conducted a social status ranking exercise. In each irrigation scheme, we invited twenty 
individual irrigation users. With the support of the local executive officer, we looked for 
participants with very different socio-economic characteristics, in an attempt to maximize 
diversity. The participants were randomly divided in four groups. Each group was asked to 
rank all members of the irrigation scheme according to their social status. To avoid 
embarrassment and overestimation or underestimation of one’s own social status, the 
participants were not asked to rank themselves. For detailed instructions and procedures of 
this ranking exercise we refer to Appendix B. 
4. Results 
The experiment was conducted in Mufindi district, which is located in the Southern 
Highlands in Tanzania. Five irrigation systems where traditional irrigation is practiced were 
selected. These irrigation systems are located in the lowlands of the district which is 
characterized by a semi-arid climate.9
In total 156 irrigation users participated in the experiment in 13 different sessions, 
distributed over the five irrigation systems. We did not allow more than 14 participants in 
 In this region agricultural income is highly dependent 
on irrigation water access (Mkavidanda and Kaswamila, 2001; Majule and Mwalyosi, 2003; 
United Republic of Tanzania, 2006). 
                                                   
9 The altitude in the lowlands of Mufindi district ranges from 1200 to 1500 meters. There is an average 
annual rainfall between 900 and 1200 mm and rainfall is unimodal and lasts from December until April 
(Ministry of Agriculture, 1999). 
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each session, so that we could provide additional assistance to illiterate participants during the 
explanation of the instructions.10
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 In the instructions we also included several control questions 
and examples to ensure participants’ understanding. One third of the participants (52) were 
female and average earnings were 2460 TSH, equal to 1.37 US$, i.e. around two days average 
income. After the experiment, the participants were asked how much the experiment 
reminded them of in real life. Only 8.3% of the participants did not recognize anything from 
real life. 
Because of our interest in bargaining in periods of scarcity, we will only use the data of 
the scarcity treatment. Table 2 shows the distribution of the decisions made by upstream and 
downstream users. What is striking is the large proportion of distributions with the upstream 
user giving a higher than equal share to the downstream user (24.5%). We know from other 
studies that offers in ultimatum games above 50% tend to be very rare (Camerer and Thaler, 
1995). It is even more striking considering that punishment in our distribution game has a 
lower cost for distributors than in ultimatum games.11
Table 2 also shows the decisions made by the downstream users. We observe quite some 
variation in downstream user strategies. In almost 40% of the cases, the downstream user 
expresses satisfaction to the upstream user. We also observe that with larger shares kept by 
 The relatively small size of the 
community where our experiment was conducted may account for this ‘super fair’ behavior. 
This is supported by the fact that similarly generous offers in ultimatum games have been 
observed in other small-scale societies (see e.g. Henrich et al., 2004). It should also be noted 
that part of the altruistic distributions may be the result of a deliberate rotation between 
altruistic and selfish distributions. While such rotation makes it possible to reconcile 
efficiency considerations with equal sharing, it is remarkable that the equal split distribution 
remains so frequently chosen, as equal sharing in the scarcity treatment makes upstream users 
forego large efficiency gains. It seems the very prominent egalitarian norms in the Tanzanian 
society make upstream users reluctant to deviate from the equal split. 
                                                   
10 We also had tested and adapted the instructions in several pilot sessions to make sure that they would be 
understandable to the illiterate and poorly educated people. 
11 Moreover, in contrast to most repeated ultimatum games where participants are randomly rematched every 
period, in our game pairs remain fixed. In this way, reputation considerations may become important and reduce 
the relative importance of fairness concerns. As demonstrated by Slembeck (1999) in such a setting proposers 
demand more and rejection rates are higher than in the standard repeated ultimatum game. He attributes this to 
the super game strategies of income-maximizing proposers who try to obtain a reputation as a tough player in the 
early rounds in order to increase future earnings. 
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the upstream user the likelihood of expressing satisfaction decreases while the proportion of 
punishment decisions increases. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of upstream and downstream users’ decisions 
Upstream user decision Downstream user decision 
Hours upstream user  Punishment Dissatisf. Silent Satisfaction 
        
0 1.4% 11  0 0 4 7 
1 3.7% 18  2 2 4 10 
2 8.6% 38  1 2 10 25 
3 12.6% 31  1 4 5 21 
4 19.0% 50  2 7 13 28 
5 24.5% 43  0 6 19 18 
6 52.8% 221  4 23 56 138 
7 72.2% 151  24 89 9 29 
8 78.7% 51  13 24 6 8 
9 84.4% 44  18 15 3 8 
10 89.6% 41  19 14 2 6 
11 95.3% 44  20 17 2 5 
12 100.0% 37  22 8 0 7 
  N = 780  126 211 133 310 
  100.0%  16.2% 27.1% 17.1% 39.7% 
 
Besides the decisions made by upstream and downstream user a third important variable 
in this study is the social status of the participants. As described before, to measure social 
status we implemented a social status ranking exercise. In each irrigation scheme we let four 
different groups rank all water users of the irrigation scheme (excluding the members that 
belong to the ranking group), with a higher rank number indicating a higher social status (rank 
1 = lowest social status; rank 2 = second lowest social status; etc.). Each ranking was 
transformed into a score, equal to the rank number divided by the total number of rungs on the 
ladder (for a similar procedure see Van Campenhout, 2007). The mean of the scores made by 
the four groups was calculated for each irrigator. These values were converted into the 
standardized deviation from the mean score per irrigation scheme, which were used as the 
irrigators’ final social status score. The average of this score is zero with the standard 
deviation being equal to 0.343. By observing the groups at work during the ranking exercise, 
it can generally be concluded that the level of consensus was relatively high. Also in the ex-
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post group discussion on advantages and disadvantages from being high, respectively low in 
the social status ranking, consensus was high. This confirms that the ‘social status’ concept 
was well understood and empirically relevant. 
It is interesting to look at how the social status variable correlates with other socio-
economic variables. First, social status correlates with wealth measured through proxies such 
as land property (spearman’s rho = 0.198, two-sided P = .015) and food security (spearman’s 
rho = 0.217, two-sided P = .008). Whereas land property is measured in number of hectares, 
for food difficulties we used five categories ranging from ‘never food secure’ to ‘always food 
secure’. Second, social status also correlates with education (spearman’s rho = 0.316, two-
sided P = .000), for which we used three different categories (1. no education, 2. primary 
education, 3. secondary education). Third, comparing male with female participants we 
observe that on average women score significantly lower on the social status variable than 
men: -0.107 versus 0.086 (t = 3.482; two-sided P = .001). Fourth, social status does not 
correlate with age (spearman’s rho = -0.010, two-sided P = .903). 
In the rest of this empirical section, we will look at the dynamic behavior of downstream 
and upstream users, taking due account of the interaction between the decisions of upstream 
and downstream users and the influence of their social status. For this, we will estimate 
several regression models. We start with an explanatory model on the behavior of the 
downstream users. 
4.2. Reaction of downstream users 
To study the likelihood of each of the available options, we estimate a multinomial 
logistic regression with the reaction of the downstream user as dependent variable. We use the 
downstream user’s reaction of “remaining silent” as reference category. As explanatory 
variables we use the following variables. 
First, we expect the reaction of a downstream user to be highly influenced by the number 
of hours during which the upstream user makes use of the water flow. It seems intuitive that 
downstream users are more inclined to express dissatisfaction or to punish the upstream user, 
the lower their received share. Moreover, with strong sharing norms it is expected that 
downstream users will compare their share with what upstream users keep for themselves. By 
doing so, it may matter whether the inequality is advantageous or disadvantageous for the 
downstream user. To control for the influence of ‘advantageous inequality’ we add a variable 
that is equal to the number of hours left for the downstream user minus six hours if this 
difference is positive. Otherwise this measure is zero. To control for the influence of 
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‘disadvantageous inequality’ we add a variable that is equal to the number of hours used by 
the upstream user minus six hours. In case this difference is negative (and inequality is thus 
advantageous for the downstream user), this measure takes the value zero. 
Second, we expect that downstream users with different social status will react differently 
to the upstream user’s distribution. In particular, we expect downstream users with low social 
status to be more reluctant to openly protest against the distribution decisions of upstream 
users (hypothesis H2). This may translate into a lower likelihood of punishment or expressing 
dissatisfaction (and a higher likelihood of expressing satisfaction) relative to remaining silent. 
To control for the social status of the downstream user we use the social status variable 
calculated as described before. The influence of social status may also interact with the 
inequality of the distribution decision of the upstream user. To control for such an effect, we 
add an interaction variable between the individual social status and the inequality variables. 
Table 3 shows the results. 
 
Table 3. Reaction of the downstream user 
 Punishment Dissatisfaction Satisfaction 
    
Social status -2.131 0.401 0.224 
 (1.491) (1.090) (0.976) 
Disadvantageous inequality 2.087*** 1.576** -0.727 
 (0.692) (0.686) (0.777) 
Disadvantageous inequality * social status 0.910 0.210 -4.326** 
 (1.430) (1.393) (1.891) 
Advantageous inequality -30.356*** -0.448 0.273 
 (0.604) (0.289) (0.244) 
Advantageous inequality * social status 3.678** 0.133 -1.062** 
 (1.665) (0.710) (0.519) 
Constant -0.735 0.284 1.170* 
 (1.027) (0.818) (0.676) 
    
Wald chi2 56251.75   
Prob > chi2 .0000   
Pseudo R2 0.3695   
    
Notes. Multinomial logistic regression with fixed effects for irrigation sites and rounds. ‘Remaining silent’ as base 
outcome. N = 620. Robust standard errors to correct for intra-pair dependencies. Significance levels two-sided: * = 
10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. According to a Small-Hsiao test the assumption of “independence of irrelevant 
alternatives” which is a necessary condition for valid estimations in the multinomial logit model cannot be 
rejected: Punishment category omitted: chi-sq. 33.665 (P-value = .670); Dissatisfaction category omitted: chi-sq. 
34.337 (P-value = .640); Satisfaction category omitted: chi-sq. 34.297 (P-value = .641). 
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As the mean of the social status variable is equal to zero, the coefficients of 
advantageous/disadvantageous inequality indicate the influence of inequality for downstream 
users with average social status. We observe that for downstream users with average social 
status a one hour increase in disadvantageous inequality increases the log of the ratio of the 
probability of punishment or expressing dissatisfaction over the probability of remaining 
silent by 2.087 and 1.576, respectively. In the third column we observe a significant negative 
coefficient of the interaction effect of the disadvantageous inequality and the social status 
variables. This indicates that the likelihood of expressing satisfaction relative to remaining 
silent is lower (higher) for people with higher (lower) than average social status. 
When inequality is advantageous for the downstream user, larger inequality of the 
distribution leads to a lower likelihood of choosing the punishment strategy relative to the 
option of remaining silent. The positive coefficient of the interaction with the social status 
variable indicates that this reduction in the likelihood is lower (higher) for downstream users 
with higher (lower) social status. 
The results presented in Table 3, however, do not give us a clear picture of the size of the 
effects on the probability of each of the possible reactions, as the results need to be interpreted 
with reference to one of the categories. To obtain a better insight into the results it is helpful 
to calculate predicted probabilities on the basis of the estimated regression coefficients. Table 
4 presents the predicted probabilities of each of the strategies under different allocations and 
for downstream users with different social status. We did so separately for three levels of 
social status: low social status equal to one standard deviation below the average, average 
social status, and high social status equal to one standard deviation above the average. The 
following differences are statistically significant between the different social status categories.  
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Table 4. Predicted probabilities of strategies under different allocations and social status 
 Low social status (-0.343) 
 
Average social status 
(0.000) 
 
High social status 
(0.343) 
            
  10% conf. interval   10% conf. interval   10% conf. interval 
  Lower Upper   Lower Upper   Lower Upper 
Disadvantageous inequality = 3           
Satisfaction 19.2% 9.9% 27.3%  0.2% 0.0% 0.9%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Silent 0.7% 0.0% 2.3%  0.7% 0.0% 2.6%  0.5% 0.0% 3.2% 
Dissatisfaction 45.1% 36.8% 55.7%  59.4% 53.0% 67.7%  63.1% 55.0% 72.1% 
Punishment 35.0% 25.1% 45.2%  39.8% 31.3% 46.1%  36.4% 27.3% 43.9% 
 100.0%    100.0%    100.0%   
            
Disadvantageous inequality = 2           
Satisfaction 35.1% 25.5% 44.5%  2.5% 0.3% 7.0%  0.1% 0.0% 0.8% 
Silent 2.8% 0.1% 5.9%  3.6% 0.1% 8.3%  3.1% 0.0% 9.4% 
Dissatisfaction 39.0% 31.4% 49.3%  67.0% 61.3% 76.1%  76.1% 69.1% 85.0% 
Punishment 23.1% 14.8% 30.5%  26.9% 18.9% 31.8%  20.7% 12.8% 25.6% 
 100.0%    100.0%    100.0%   
            
Disadvantageous inequality = 1           
Satisfaction 51.8% 44.8% 62.0%  20.1% 8.2% 29.9%  5.3% 0.8% 11.5% 
Silent 8.6% 0.8% 12.6%  13.7% 3.1% 19.4%  14.8% 1.7% 21.3% 
Dissatisfaction 27.3% 19.5% 35.6%  53.3% 46.0% 67.8%  70.8% 63.0% 84.8% 
Punishment 12.3% 6.1% 17.2%  12.9% 7.7% 17.0%  9.1% 4.4% 12.6% 
 100.0%    100.0%    100.0%   
            
Equal split           
Satisfaction 59.1% 51.6% 73.3%  61.2% 55.8% 77.4%  62.3% 54.9% 77.7% 
Silent 21.0% 1.3% 27.9%  20.2% 1.0% 25.2%  19.0% 0.8% 25.9% 
Dissatisfaction 14.8% 8.7% 21.1%  16.2% 11.4% 20.7%  17.6% 10.3% 23.7% 
Punishment 5.1% 2.1% 7.5%  2.4% 1.0% 3.2%  1.1% 0.3% 1.7% 
 100.0%    100.0%    100.0%   
            
Advantageous inequality = 1           
Satisfaction 78.8% 73.5% 90.5%  72.5% 68.9% 83.9%  64.9% 59.5% 84.2% 
Silent 14.8% 3.1% 19.6%  18.2% 7.0% 21.9%  21.7% 1.0% 27.2% 
Dissatisfaction 6.4% 2.5% 9.6%  9.4% 5.3% 12.3%  13.4% 7.8% 17.4% 
Punishment 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
100.0%    100.0%    100.0%   
  
   
 
   
 
  
Note. Confidence intervals were calculated using the percentile bootstrap method with 1000 replications and 
implemented with the prvalue command in Stata (Xu and Long, 2005). 
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First, in case distributions are disadvantageous for the downstream user, downstream 
users with different social status do not differ on their inclination to choose the punishment 
strategy. However, they do strongly differ on the likelihood to express satisfaction. For 
instance, when upstream users only allocate 3 hours water access to downstream users (i.e., 
disadvantageous inequality = 3), 19.2% of the downstream users with low social status still 
express satisfaction. In contrast, almost none of the downstream users with average or high 
social status will do so. These results indicate that downstream users with low social status 
make very little use of the non-punishment protest options (expressing dissatisfaction or 
remaining silent are considered to be forms of protesting, as the only other alternative is 
expressing satisfaction). They either protest with the punishment option or they do not protest 
at all. A possible reason for this lies in their higher conflict aversion. They are reluctant to run 
the risk of entering into conflict without having the guarantee that it reduces inequality. 
Second, when resources are equally distributed, the probability of expressing satisfaction 
does not differ between downstream users of different social status. The likelihood of 
punishment however, is higher for upstream users with low social status. This contradicts 
hypothesis H2. It is however consistent with the hypothesized self-serving bias in fairness 
conceptions (with low social status players focusing on correcting initial wealth inequality 
and high social status players on equally sharing the additional resources). For the situation 
where downstream users get 7 hours water access (advantageous inequality = 1), no 
differences are found among downstream users of different social status. We summarize the 
main observations on the downstream user’s strategy choice in the following result. 
 
Result 1: Downstream users’ strategy choices 
Downstream users’ propensity to choose the punishment option significantly increases with 
higher disadvantageous inequality. Downstream users with low social status, however, have a 
higher tendency of expressing satisfaction when they receive lower than equal shares. When 
water is equally distributed downstream users with low social status have a slightly but 
significantly higher likelihood to choose the punishment option. 
4.3. Distribution behavior of upstream users 
We will now investigate the strategies followed by the upstream user. In particular, we study 
the state dependence of upstream users’ strategy choice, how strategies are changed in 
response to the reaction of downstream users, and how all this may depend on the social 
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status of the upstream user. For the sake of simplifying the analysis and given the importance 
of the equal split distribution as reference, we group the distribution decisions made by the 
upstream users into the following three strategies: 1) ‘Altruistic’ distributions, where the 
upstream user makes less use (in number of hours) of the water flow than the downstream 
user; 2) ‘equal split’ distributions, where both users make equal use of the water flow; and 3) 
‘selfish’ distributions, where the upstream user makes more use of the water flow than the 
downstream user. 
To have a first idea of the frequency of strategy changes, we elaborate a transition matrix. 
In Table 5, we observe a considerable proportion of strategy changes from altruistic 
distributions to selfish distributions (27.6%), and a lower proportion of changes in the other 
direction (15.3%). Part of these strategy changes is probably the result of a deliberate rotation 
strategy. More detailed analysis below will shed light on this. Remember that rotation in our 
distribution game can substantially increase the total pie while maintaining equal sharing over 
time. Furthermore, it is remarkable that changes from altruistic into selfish distributions are 
more frequent than in the other direction. A similar but less pronounced pattern is observed 
for the equal split distributions. Strategies are frequently changed from the equal split to 
selfish distributions (20.0%), whereas less frequently in the other direction (14.2%). This 
indicates that apart from possible rotation there is a certain tendency in favor of the selfish 
strategy. 
 
Table 5. Frequency of strategy changes 
     
 Altruistic (t) Equal split (t) Selfish (t) Total 
Altruistic (t-1) 61.9% 10.5% 27.6% 100.0% 
Equal split (t-1) 8.1% 71.9% 20.0% 100.0% 
Selfish (t-1) 15.3% 14.2% 70.5% 100.0% 
 
We will now elaborate an explanatory model of strategy choice that controls for state 
dependence, the influence of punishment by the downstream user and the interaction with 
social status. We denote the strategy choice of the upstream user by { }2,1,0, ∈= jy ri  with j 
referring to each of the three possible strategies (0 = equal split, 1 = altruistic, 2 = selfish), 
index i to the individual and r to the round. We will estimate a multinomial probit regression 
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with the equal split as the reference strategy.12
{ }2,1,0, ∈riy
 In particular, we associate each outcome 
variable  to three latent variables rjiv ,,  for j = 0, 1, 2 through the following link 
function:  
{ } )1(0,,max ,0,,2,,1,,0,,,, === ririririrjiri vandvvvvwithjy  
The outcome corresponds to whichever latent variable is greatest, the idea being that we 
do not observe the latent values of each individual choice made in each round, but only the 
choices made ( riy , ). This is equivalent to observing the largest element of rjiv ,,  for j = 0, 1, 2 
(Imai and van Dyk, 2005, Jackman, 2000). 
We assume a multivariate normal distribution on the latent variables. In our case, this is 
essentially a bivariate normal distribution with zero mean for both dimensions and an 
unknown 2x2 variance-covariance matrix. Furthermore, our latent variables are assumed to be 
determined by state dependence, the influence of punishment by the downstream user and the 
interaction with social status. More in particular, we use the following explanatory variables. 
First, upstream users may take account of the strategy they chose in the previous round. 
For instance, they may stick to the same strategy, or they may follow certain rotation. To 
control for this we use the dummy variables 1,1, −riy  and 1,2, −riy , which are equal to one when 
the strategy chosen in the previous round was the altruistic strategy and the selfish strategy, 
respectively (using the equal split as reference category). Second, it may be important whether 
the strategy in the previous round resulted in punishment. To control for this, we split up the 
dummy variables for the strategy chosen in the previous round in dependence of whether or 
not this strategy made the downstream user opt for punishment, i.e. 11, =−rip  in case of 
punishment. As with the altruistic and equal split strategies punishment is very uncommon13
ix
, 
we only did so for the selfish strategy. This allows us to study the effectiveness of punishment 
in making the upstream user abandon the selfish strategy. Third, upstream users with varying 
social status may focus on different distributions (hypothesis H1). This may translate into 
differences in the likelihood of each distribution strategy between upstream users of varying 
social status, for which we test by adding the social status variable ( ). It may also translate 
into differences in state dependence of the upstream users’ strategy choice. To test the latter, 
                                                   
12 A probit regression has the advantage that it is not constrained by the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) property that is characteristic of the multinomial logistic model. 
13 Whereas the punishment rate is 32.1% when the selfish strategy is followed, punishment rates are only 
4.7% and 2.0% when respectively the altruistic and equal split strategies are followed. 
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we add interaction terms between the social status variable and each of the three above 
defined dummies (selfish strategy - punishment; selfish strategy - no-punishment; altruistic 
strategy). We also include the rounds and irrigation sites as fixed effects. Hence, rid , is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if round is r for individual i. Similarly, kis , is a 
dummy taking the value of one if individual i belongs to irrigation site k. This results in the 
following model for the latent utility model: 
( ) ( )irijijririjririjrijjrji xyxpypyyv .1 1,1,,11,1,2,31,1,2,21,1,10,, −−−−−− +⋅+−⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅+= βδγγγγ  
( )( ) ( )( )( ) rjikikjrirjiririjiririj sdxpyxpy ,,,,,,1,1,2,,31,1,2,,2 .1... µσρββ +++−+⋅+ −−−−   (2) 
for 2,1=j  and γ, δ, β, ρ and σ are all parameters to be estimated. 
As we have an autoregressive part in our model, we cannot use standard methods to 
estimate the equation. This can be observed by decomposing the residual rji ,,µ in equation (2) 
in an unobserved individual specific effect that is time-invariant ji,α  and a time-dependent 
error term rji ,,ε . It is easy to see there is potential correlation between (a function of) the 
lagged dependent variable and the composed error term rji ,,µ  through the individual specific 
effects. The estimation of this dynamic model requires an assumption about the relationship 
between the observations 1,, jiv  in round r = 1 and the unobserved heterogeneity ji,α  and 
observables ix  (being the social status of the upstream user in our specification). A first 
option is to assume that the initial observations are exogenous. In this case a standard random 
effects model can be estimated, since the likelihood can be decomposed into two independent 
factors and the joint probability for r = 2, . . . , T maximized without reference to that for r = 1 
(Stewart, 2006). This assumption is plausible if the start of the process coincides with the start 
of the observation period for each individual. 
However, as we only take the observations of the scarcity treatment for the analysis, the 
start of the observations does not coincide with the start of the process. People have played 
another treatment before, and with the same people as the pairs of upstream and downstream 
users remain fixed. Therefore, a standard random effects model might not be appropriate. An 
alternative approach suggested by Heckman (1981) is to use a reduced form approximation to 
the initial observations. In particular, we will add the following equation to the estimation 
(again associated to latent variables in a similar way as equation 1): 
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jijiijjji xv ,,
11
01,, εαδγ ++⋅+=  for 2,1=j   (3) 
In this model, the random effects are assumed to arise from a multivariate distribution. To 
obtain the marginal distribution of the response it is necessary to integrate out the random 
effects. This integration, however, does not have a closed-form solution when the random 
effects are multivariate normal. Methods for performing numerical integration to approximate 
the marginal distribution are computationally intensive. Moreover, inference in the random 
effects multinomial probit model is complicated because it requires evaluation of multi-
dimensional integrals. An alternative approach uses Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
simulation to estimate parameters of such model (Haynes et al., 2008). We implemented such 
approach using WinBUGS software (Spiegelhalter et al., 1998) which implements MCMC 
simulation with the Gibbs Sampler. Model 1 in Table 6 presents the results of this estimation. 
For documentation purposes, we also include Model 2, which presents the estimation results 
of equation (2) for all observations without the simultaneous estimation of equation (3). As 
the exogeneity assumption of the initial observations behind Model 2 is not fulfilled, we will 
only focus on the results of Model 1. 
Looking at the upper part of the table that presents the regression results of equation 3 
(i.e. with only the initial observations), we observe that in the first round upstream users with 
lower (higher) than average social status are more (less) inclined to opt for the altruistic 
strategy relative to the equal split strategy. The lower part of the table shows the estimation 
results of equation 2 that uses the observations from round 2 onwards. To discuss these results 
we will structure the presentation according to the strategy chosen in the previous round, as 
indicated by the different explanatory variables.  
We first look at state dependence when having chosen the equal split strategy in the 
previous round, i.e. when setting all dummy variables in the equation equal to 0. Based on the 
significant coefficient of the social status variable in the second column, we can conclude that 
when having chosen the equal split strategy in the previous round the likelihood of switching 
to the selfish strategy instead of sticking to the equal split strategy is lower (higher) for people 
with higher (lower) than average social status. 
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Table 6. Strategy choice of the upstream user 
     
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Altruism Selfish  Altruism Selfish 
      
(r = 1) – equation 3      
Social status -1.367* -0.432  – – 
 (0.730) (1.753)  – – 
Constant 8.808 11.630  – – 
 (6.210) (11.240)  – – 
      
(r > 1) – equation 2      
Social status -1.077 -2.233**  -1.819* -2.454* 
 (0.716) (0.995)  (0.943) (1.266) 
(Altruism) (r-1) 1.391*** 0.413  0.878** 0.399 
 (0.317) (0.399)  (0.366) (0.441) 
(Altruism) (r-1) * social status 0.639 3.244***  0.465 3.093** 
 (0.861) (1.212)  (0.927) (1.365) 
(Selfish + not punished) (r-1) 0.778** 0.745*  0.451 0.592 
 (0.308) (0.399)  (0.335) (0.408) 
(Selfish + not punished) (r-1) * social status 1.175 1.383  1.105 1.048 
 (0.878) (1.028)  (0.950) (1.218) 
(Selfish + punished) (r-1) 1.038*** 0.645  0.732 0.345 
 (0.397) (0.518)  (0.454) (0.531) 
(Selfish + punished) (r-1) * social status 2.955*** 3.235***  3.159*** 3.222** 
 (1.045) (1.235)  (1.177) (1.442) 
Constant 8.002 11.590  -0.589 -1.848 
 (6.154) (11.140)  (2.903) (2.805) 
      
      
Sigma (estimated means of random effects) 
1.843** 4.395***  3.688** 7.108*** 
(0.830) (1.465)  (1.443) (2.048) 
Estimated variances of sigma -10.050 -12.700  -1.545 0.507 
(6.186) (11.120)  (3.048) (2.682) 
D = - 2 * sum of log likelihood contributions 
472.300   419.200  
(33.080)   (26.810)  
Notes. Multinomial probit regression with fixed effects for irrigation sites and rounds. Equal split as base category. N 
= 666. Significance levels two-sided: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. We use diffuse normal priors for the estimated 
parameters and diffuse gamma priors for the standard errors of the random effects. All parameters have 0 as 
initial values, while the standard errors of the random effects have initial values of 0.2. We ran one chain for 
300000 iterations, with a burn-in period of 4000. 
 
Second, we look at the effect of having chosen the altruistic strategy in the previous round 
instead of the equal split strategy. We observe in the first column a significant and positive 
24 
coefficient of the dummy variable that indicates whether or not the upstream user chose the 
altruistic strategy in the previous round. This indicates that upstream users of average social 
status who chose the altruistic strategy in the previous round have a higher likelihood of 
choosing this strategy again relative to choosing the equal split. In the second column of the 
model we also observe a significant and positive coefficient of the interaction of the social 
status variable and the dummy variable that indicates whether or not the upstream user chose 
the altruistic strategy in the previous round. This indicates that for upstream users with a 
higher than average social status (i.e. with the social status variable larger than zero) having 
chosen the altruistic strategy in the previous round increases the likelihood of choosing the 
selfish strategy relative to the equal split strategy. 
Third, we look at the effect of having chosen the selfish strategy in the previous round 
instead of the equal split strategy without being punished. We observe in both the first and the 
second columns of the model a significant and positive coefficient of the dummy equal to one 
when having chosen the selfish strategy without punishment. This indicates that for upstream 
users with average social status having chosen the selfish strategy without being punished 
increases the relative likelihood of both the altruistic and the selfish strategy relative to the 
equal split strategy. 
Fourth, things are different when upstream users are punished after choosing the selfish 
strategy. In the first column of the model we observe that both the dummy variable that 
indicates whether the upstream user chose the selfish strategy and was punished in the 
previous round and the interaction effect of this variable with the social status variable are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of the dummy variable 
indicates that upstream users with average social status have a higher likelihood of choosing 
the altruistic strategy relative to the equal split strategy when having chosen the selfish 
strategy and being punished instead of having chosen the equal split strategy. The coefficient 
of the interaction term indicates that this effect is stronger for upstream users with higher than 
average social status whereas the likelihood of choosing the altruistic strategy relative to the 
equal split strategy actually reduces for upstream users with a lower than average social 
status. (i.e. with negative social status variable). The coefficient of the interaction term is also 
positive and significant in the second column. This indicates that being punished after having 
played the selfish strategy reduces the likelihood of choosing the selfish strategy instead of 
the equal split strategy for upstream users with lower than average social status, but increases 
this likelihood for upstream users with higher than average social status. 
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Table 7. Predicted probabilities of strategies, subject to social status and strategy (r-1) 
 Low social status (-0.343) 
 
Average social status 
(0.000) 
 
High social status 
(0.343) 
            
  10% conf. interval   10% conf. interval   10% conf. interval 
r = 1  Lower Upper   Lower Upper   Lower Upper 
Altruistic 26.8% 6.4% 42.4%  17.2% 14.8% 43.3%  9.6% 0.8% 29.4% 
Equal split 19.0% 2.5% 48.4%  27.9% 3.8% 37.2%  35.8% 10.7% 57.7% 
Selfish 54.5% 42.8% 60.5%  54.9% 45.6% 56.9%  54.6% 40.1% 64.7% 
 100.0%    100.0%    100.0%   
                        
r > 1            
(Equal split) (r-1) = 1          
Altruistic 11.4% 4.6% 19.7%  6.5% 3.08% 12.03%  3.0% 1.05% 7.37% 
Equal split 23.80% 13.8% 34.5%  49.2% 41.34% 56.12%  72.2% 65.17% 77.83% 
Selfish 64.8% 55.4% 72.7%  44.3% 37.50% 51.23%  24.8% 18.63% 31.84% 
 100.0%    100.00%    100.00%   
            
(Altruism) (r-1) = 1          
Altruistic 45.3% 31.0% 54.3%  37.7% 28.09% 44.40%  30.5% 16.43% 38.69% 
Equal split 13.7% 5.7% 26.0%  11.8% 5.96% 20.28%  9.7% 2.67% 23.11% 
Selfish 41.0% 34.2% 46.6%  50.5% 45.07% 54.93%  59.8% 50.45% 66.24% 
 100.0%    100.00%    100.00%   
            
(Selfish + not punished) (r-1) = 1          
Altruistic 17.3% 9.5% 23.9%  19.6% 13.41% 25.31%  21.7% 12.32% 30.83% 
Equal split 13.0% 6.2% 22.1%  17.6% 11.59% 24.56%  22.9% 13.35% 33.80% 
Selfish 69.7% 62.4% 75.3%  62.8% 57.63% 67.32%  55.4% 47.67% 62.07% 
 100.00%    100.00%    100.00%   
            
(Selfish + punished) (r-1) = 1          
Altruistic 12.7% 4.5% 24.3%  26.4% 15.98% 34.50%  37.8% 24.51% 43.54% 
Equal split 34.8% 21.3% 47.9%  14.7% 6.89% 25.47%  3.0% 0.39% 12.30% 
Selfish 52.5% 41.5% 62.5%  58.9% 51.37% 64.79%  59.2% 51.55% 64.25% 
 
100.00%    100.00%    100.00%   
  
   
 
   
 
  
 
An important limitation of multinomial regression models is that the likelihood of each of 
the outcomes needs to be interpreted with reference to one of the outcome categories. It is 
therefore not straightforward to get an idea of the size of the effects on the likelihood of the 
individual strategies. In order to obtain a clearer picture of the size of the identified effects of 
social status we calculated predicted probabilities. Table 7 presents the predicted probabilities 
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of each strategy conditional on the strategy chosen in the previous round and the social status 
of the upstream user. We did so separately for three levels of social status: upstream users 
with low, average and high social status. In the description of the results we will focus on the 
influence of the social status of the upstream user. We will comment where the differences 
between the different social status categories are statistically significant, as indicated by the 
confidence intervals. 
In the first round (r = 1), we observe that more than half of the upstream users choose the 
selfish strategy, without any significant differences between the different social status 
categories. From round 2 onwards, the predicted probabilities indicate that upstream users 
with high social status have a higher tendency of sticking to the equal split. If they chose the 
equal split in the previous round they have a 72.2% probability to choose this strategy again. 
Upstream users with low social status, in contrast, only have a 23.8% probability. Instead of 
choosing the equal split strategy again they tend to move to the selfish strategy. The 
probability of switching to the selfish strategy is 64.8% for upstream users with low social 
status, whereas upstream users with high social status have only a 24.8% likelihood. 
Considering the confidence intervals of the estimated probabilities, these differences are 
statistically significant. 
We also observe that upstream users with high social status have a higher likelihood to 
rotate between selfish and altruistic allocations. This is confirmed by the observation that 
upstream users with high social status have a higher probability to switch to the selfish 
strategy after having chosen the altruistic strategy in the previous round (59.8%) in 
comparison with upstream users with low social status (41.0%). When looking at the strategy 
choice after having chosen the selfish strategy we need to distinguish the situation where the 
selfish strategy resulted in punishment from where this strategy was not answered by a 
punishment decision by the paired downstream user. First, when no punishment occurred, we 
observe that the likelihood to stick to the selfish strategy is lower for upstream users with high 
social status (55.4%) than it is for low social status players (69.7%). Upstream users with high 
social status have a lower tendency to stick to the selfish strategy. Second, in case the 
upstream user is punished, upstream users with high social status have a 37.8% probability of 
switching to the altruistic strategy, whereas low social status users only have a 12.7% 
probability. 
Taking together these results, we can conclude that that upstream users with high social 
status focus on equal distributions (by either sticking to the equal split or rotating between 
selfish and altruistic strategies), whereas upstream users with lower social status aim at 
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correcting initial wealth inequality by following a selfish strategy. This confirms hypothesis 
H1. 
The results also indicate that upstream users with different social status react differently 
to being punished. As indicated above, when punished upstream users with low social status 
have a higher tendency to switch to the equal split strategy (34.8%) in comparison with 
upstream users with high social status (3.0%). When they are punished upstream users with 
high social status tend to move to either the altruistic or the selfish strategy. Whereas the 
estimated probabilities of the selfish strategy do not differ between the different categories of 
social status, the probability of switching to the altruistic strategy is substantially higher for 
upstream users with high social status (37.8%) than upstream users with low social status 
(12.7%). We summarize these observations in a second main result. 
 
Result 2: Upstream users’ strategy choices 
After choosing the equal split strategy upstream users with high social status are more likely 
to stick to this strategy, whereas low social status users have a tendency to move to the selfish 
strategy. When not choosing the equal split strategy, however, upstream users with high 
social status show a higher propensity to rotate between selfish and altruistic strategies. 
When punished after choosing the selfish strategy low social status players tend to move to 
the equal split, whereas high social status players tend to move to the altruistic strategy. 
 
Two elements merit further discussion. First, we observed that upstream users with low 
social status over time move from the equal split to the selfish strategy but move back to the 
equal split when they are punished. This indicates that they play strategically. They want to 
move to their focal point (selfish strategy) but are aware that downstream users may prefer at 
least an equal share of the resources. Also upstream users with high social status show some 
strategic behavior, as they tend to move to the altruistic strategy when they are punished.14
Second, it is not entirely clear why upstream users with high social status move to the 
altruistic strategy when punished, whereas upstream users with low social status switch to the 
equal split. Different explanations are plausible. Assuming that upstream users can make 
 
                                                   
14 It should be noted that this positive influence of punishment on pro-social behavior is in contrast with 
results from lab experiments with college students. D’Exelle and Riedl (2008), for example, found in a repeated 
distribution game with fixed matching that distributors actually become more selfish when punished, to 
compensate for the lost income. This difference is likely due to the larger conflict aversion of people in small-
scale societies where, being economically dependent on each other, conflicts can have large economic 
consequences. 
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inferences about the social status of their opponent it is likely they try to avoid further 
punishment by switching to the focal point of their opponent. Upstream users with high social 
status, for example, expect downstream users to have equal or lower social status. They may 
anticipate that because of biases in fairness conceptions it is very likely that their opponent 
demands a higher than equal share. Another explanation may be related to different weights 
attached to efficiency considerations. As far as social status is associated with leadership in 
the village which gives certain responsibility for the collective welfare, upstream users with 
higher social status may prefer the altruistic strategy instead of the equal split distribution 
because it leads to large efficiency gains. Additional research is needed to verify these 
explanations. 
4.4. Efficiency implications 
It is worthwhile to look at the efficiency implications of the results. Efficiency is affected 
by punishment and equal split distributions. If a downstream user punishes the upstream user 
punishment costs reduce the total amount of resources available, affecting efficiency. On the 
other hand, efficiency is increased by deviating from the equal split, as this makes that one of 
both players receives a water share above the production threshold. Taking both elements 
together, it is clear that the altruistic strategy leads to the most efficient outcome. Not only 
does it lead to zero punishment; it also results in a substantial efficiency increase because 
more than the minimum threshold is allocated to one of the water users. The selfish strategy is 
less optimal as it has a considerable likelihood of being followed by punishment. In Table 4 
we observed that the probability of punishment increases with larger disadvantageous 
inequality. The probability of punishment averages around 9-12% when the upstream users 
allocates 7 hours water access to herself (disadvantageous inequality = 1), whereas with 9 
hours (disadvantageous inequality = 3) this increases up to 35%. The selfish strategy, 
however, may be preferred above the equal split where the likelihood of punishment is almost 
non-existent but where efficiency gains are limited as both water users receive a water share 
below the critical production input. Nevertheless, we observe that equal sharing remains a 
commonly chosen strategy, despite the high foregone efficiency gains. 
What do our results tell us about the efficiency implications of the social status of 
upstream and downstream users? To study this, we compare the frequencies of the strategies 
between upstream users of high and low social status (with high >= 0 and low < 0). According 
to a Pearson F-statistic, differences are not statistically significant (F = 0.962; two-sided P = 
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.384).15
5. Conclusion and discussion 
 We also have previously seen that the likelihood of punishment does not differ 
between downstream users of different social status. Taking both results together, we can 
conclude that the social status of upstream and downstream users is not important for 
efficiency. It should be noted that for equality, in contrast, it surely matters who assumes the 
upstream user’s role. Upstream users have a first mover advantage, which explains the 
considerable proportion of selfish strategies. Giving the role of upstream user to users of low 
social status instead of high social status, therefore, tends to correct the initial wealth 
inequality between users of different social status. 
Bilateral bargaining in developing countries may be very different from what existing 
economic theory predicts. The settings people in developing countries are confronted with 
differ in at least two important ways from those simulated in existing literature. People in 
developing countries are often confronted with resource scarcity and most of them live in 
close-knit small societies where elements of social status are important determinants of social 
and economic interaction, including bargaining. The existing economic literature on bilateral 
bargaining, however, has remained silent so far on how both elements shape bargaining 
behavior. The main purpose of this paper is to produce experimental evidence to test 
bargaining models appropriate for these settings. Better knowledge about the influence of 
social status on how individual agents deal with equity and efficiency issues, allows us to 
derive implications for better policy design. For example, knowing the individual social status 
of people bargaining with each other, one could intervene in settings where bargaining 
outcomes with large foregone efficiency gains are expected. 
To study the influence of social status on bilateral bargaining in a situation of resource 
scarcity, we brought a group of people heterogeneous on social status to the field lab and let 
them participate in an anonymous bargaining experiment. As pay-offs are the same for all 
participants behavioral differences in the experiment could only be attributed to non-payoff 
asymmetries, such as heterogeneity in real-life social status. Our results show that at least part 
of the influence of social status on bilateral bargaining works through self-serving biases in 
fairness conceptions. Whereas distributors with high social status (who generally face better 
economic conditions) have a tendency to share resources equally, low social status 
                                                   
15 The chi-square test is converted into a Pearson F-statistic after correcting for dependencies of observations 
due to multiple observations per upstream user. 
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distributors aim at receiving higher than equal shares to correct for initial unequal conditions. 
Upstream users with higher social status not only have a higher propensity to choose the equal 
split strategy; they are also more inclined to rotate as to who receives a share above the 
production threshold. This is an important observation as such rotation makes it possible to 
obtain efficiency gains while guaranteeing equal sharing over time. Finally, there is evidence 
that people play strategically. Upstream users with low social status over time move to their 
focal point (i.e. a higher than equal share), but when punished switch back to the equal split 
distribution. Upstream users with high social status switch to altruistic distributions when 
punished. 
We end with extending on how our study links up with two important strands of literature 
and we make suggestions for further extensions to our study. First, our study is related to the 
discussion on the economic implications of egalitarian sharing norms in small-scale societies 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Platteau (2000) argues that strong egalitarian norms may lead to 
considerable efficiency losses in terms of lost opportunities for individuals and the wider 
society, and consequently hamper economic growth. This is confirmed in our distribution 
experiment by the considerable proportion of equal split distributions despite the large 
foregone efficiency gains. At the same time, however, our study also shows considerable 
heterogeneity in social preferences, which are considered to be crucial to enforce social norms 
(Fehr and Camerer, 2004), including sharing norms. In this way, it suggests that egalitarian 
norms may actually be much weaker, especially when resources are scarce as simulated in our 
study. One could doubt of course whether our results are robust to giving up anonymity in our 
game. We know that access to information on heterogeneity created by differences in outside 
options or conversion rates may influence bargaining behavior (Schmitt, 2004), and that 
people tend to behave strategically when they have the possibility of hiding information about 
themselves (Boles et al., 2000). This links up with a debate on whether people have an 
intrinsic preference for behaving according to the social norm or they only want to appear as 
if they are doing so. To control for a possible social distance effect it could therefore be 
interesting to extent our distribution game to allow for different amounts of information 
people have about each other. 
Second, our study also contributes to the debate on the external validity of bargaining 
games. From a comparison of ultimatum games in 15 different cultural environments Henrich 
et al. (2001) found considerably more behavioral variability across groups than had been 
found in previous cross-cultural research. They found that ultimatum game offers increase 
with two important characteristics of small-scale societies: the ‘Payoff to Cooperation’ and 
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‘Market Integration’. In this respect, it would be interesting to replicate our research in 
environments that differ on these dimensions. In the same study, Henrich et al. (2001) also 
concluded that individual-level economic and demographic variables do not explain behavior 
either within or across groups. However, as the results of our study have clearly shown, this is 
surely not the case in a repeated bargaining setting with resource scarcity, where variation in 
bargaining correlates with differences in socio-economic status. 
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Appendix A. Experimental procedures and instructions 
[When people enter the meeting room, they are asked for their name. We have a list of invited candidates, a random 
sample of all irrigation users. Their name is marked and they are given a sticker with an identity letter, which we ask 
them to stick on their shirt. It is explained that this identity letter is unique and allows us to identify them during the 
exercise while guaranteeing complete confidentiality. This is important, as they are able to earn real money in the 
exercise. They are asked to take a seat in the meeting room. Further instructions are given once sufficient people have 
shown up.] 
“Thanks for your interest. We are from the universities of Gent and Antwerp (Belgium) and we are making a study on 
local economic development and poverty. This study is important as it might help policymakers who are interested in 
combating poverty and stimulate economic development”. 
“You are invited to participate in an exercise, which allows you to earn real money. How much you earn depends on 
the decisions you will be asked to make, as well as the decisions of the other people.” 
“Participation is voluntary. Your decisions will be dealt with in a confidential way, i.e. nobody in the village will ever 
know your individual decisions, or the money you will have earned. The money you earn will be paid out to you 
privately and confidentially after the exercise. During the whole exercise, you are not allowed to communicate with the 
other participants.” 
 
Part one – Water abundance treatment (5 rounds) 
“In part 1 of the exercise, you are matched with one other person. Imagine that you and the other person are both 
connected to the same irrigation channel. One person is located immediately ‘upstream’ of the other person. We call 
the first person the ‘upstream person’, whereas we refer to the second person as the ‘downstream person’. Later we 
will inform you whether you are an upstream or a downstream person. It is important that you realize that you will 
never get to know the identity of this other person you are matched with. Nor will the other person ever get to know 
your identity.” 
“As the water flow passes first by the upstream person, this person has the possibility to distribute the water flow 
between him/herself and the downstream person. He/she does this in the following way. We assume there is a constant 
flow of water and the upstream person has to decide how many hours he/she will extract water from the irrigation 
channel, from a total of 12 hours per day for each day of the month. It is important to realize that the downstream user 
cannot make use of the irrigation channel while the upstream user makes us of it. This means that the downstream user 
can only make use of the irrigation channel during the hours the upstream user does not make use of it. For instance, if 
the upstream user decides to use the water channel during 10 hours every day of the month, the downstream user will 
only be able to make use of the water channel during the remaining 2 hours.”  
[Distribute decision cards for first exercise. Stick flipchart with decision card on the wall] 
“To make decisions in the exercise you will make use of decision cards. On the decision card you received we will do 
a first exercise together. We pretend you all are an upstream user now, and you have to decide on the number of hours 
to make use of the water in the irrigation channel. On the decision card, you observe 12 dots, representing the 
maximum number of hours one can make use of the irrigation channel. To make a decision you need to color the 
number of dots equal to the number of hours during which you wish to make use of the irrigation channel.” 
[They keep the decision card. Distribute the production table for the abundance treatment. Stick flipchart with 
production table on the wall] 
“The hours of water and thus the amount of water one is able to extract from the irrigation channel to irrigate his/her 
plot determines his/her income. The more water one uses on his/her plot, the more s/he can harvest and earn. How 
much one can earn is indicated in the production table. You observe three columns. In the first column, you observe 
the entire range of decision options for the upstream user. He/she can choose between 0 and 12 (included) number of 
hours (number of black dots) making use of the irrigation channel. The second column indicates the harvest and profit 
of the upstream user for a chosen number of hours. For instance, if the upstream user decides to make use of the 
irrigation channel during 8 hours, s/he will obtain an income of 425 TSH from the harvest of the irrigated field. This 
means that the downstream user can only make use of it during the remaining 4 hours and will obtain an income of 175 
TSH. Another example: if the upstream user takes water during 6 hours every day, the downstream user will remain 
with 6 hours per day in that month. The upstream user will then earn 325 TSH, the downstream user 325 TSH. It is 
important that you realize that you can earn real money. The total you earn will be paid out to you after the end of the 
exercise.” 
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“In the production table, you also observe that there is a minimum required amount of water, equal to a flow of 4 hours 
per day, below which harvest is extremely low. In other words, if any of both users uses less than the minimum 
required water quantity, his/her production will be very low; he will only get 50 TSH. Above this threshold, harvest 
drastically increases, and the more water one uses, the higher his/her income.” 
“Now look at the decision card: chose a number of hours of water you want to use and color the number of dots. Look 
on the production table how much the upstream user can earn if s/he gets that number of hours of water, and write this 
on the decision card.” 
 [They color dots on the decision card to choose hours of water and write the earnings of the upstream user on the 
same decision card] 
 “Now look at the third column of the production table which indicates the harvest and profit the downstream user will 
obtain. Write down the earnings of the downstream user on the decision card now.” 
[Show the second part of the decision card on flip chart]. 
“After the upstream user made the decision on the hours of water he/she will use and filling in his/her earnings and the 
earnings of the downstream user on the decision card, the decision card will be given to the downstream user. He/she 
will then know the decision made by the upstream user. The downstream user knows that next month the upstream 
user will have to make a new distribution decision again. So, the downstream user may find it important to give his/her 
reaction regarding the decision made by the upstream user. The downstream user needs to choose between the 
following four reactions. First, he/she may decide to communicate to the upstream water user that he/she is satisfied 
with the amount of water and with the harvest he/she obtains. Second, he/she may decide to do nothing. Third, he/she 
may decide to communicate to the upstream water user that he/she is dissatisfied with the amount of water and with 
the harvest obtained. Fourth, the downstream user may decide to go to a mediator who punishes the upstream water 
user. The mediator punishes the upstream person by giving him/her a fine, which reduces his/her earnings by 100 TSH. 
The downstream user, however, has to pay a cost for resorting to the mediator (such as transport costs, ‘judicial’ cost, 
time…), of 30 TSH.” 
“After the downstream user decides on his/her reaction to the upstream user, the decision card is returned to the 
upstream user. This person will look at it and then make a decision on the water distribution for the next month.  
[Distribute an ‘example’ decision card with 8 dots colored] 
“We now distributed an example of a decision card. Imagine that you are a downstream user and, this month, the 
upstream user left a certain number of hours of water per day for you, the downstream user. You know that the 
upstream user will distribute water again next month. Now decide on your reaction to the distribution made by the 
upstream user. Mark an X under the action you want to take.” 
[Distribute ‘example’ decision card with 12 dots for the upstream user and where a downstream user decided to 
punish the upstream user via the mediator] 
“We now distributed an example of a decision card where an upstream user decided to use 12 hours of water. The 
downstream user was not happy with this. He/she called in a mediator for which he paid 30 TSH which he/she has to 
pay from his/her earnings. Calculate now how much remains for this downstream user.” 
“At the same time, the upstream user was given a fine of 100 TSH which will be deduced from his/her earnings. 
Calculate now how much remains for the upstream user.” 
 
Before the start of the experiment 
[Distribute ID cards, which show ID letter and upstream/downstream role] 
“On the ID card you received you see your ID letter, the same as on your sticker, and you see if you are an upstream or 
a downstream user. Upstream users will have a triangle symbol on their ID cards, downstream users a square symbol.” 
“Before starting with the exercise, we emphasize once again that it is important that you realize that you will never get 
to know the identity of the other person you are matched with, nor during nor after the exercise. Nor will the other 
person ever get to know your identity. We also ask you to give each other sufficient privacy, when taking decisions. 
Make sure that other people do not see the decision you write on the decision cards. Communication is not allowed 
during the exercise. If you have a question, please raise your hand, so that one of us can come to you to answer your 
question in private.” 
“You will now do the same exercise as we did together: some of you are upstream users, others are downstream users. 
You will be so for the rest of the exercise. Each upstream user is matched with one downstream user. You will be 
matched with the same person during the rest of the exercise. Each upstream user will decide on the number of hours 
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he/she will use water from the irrigation channel. He/she will write down his/her earnings and the earnings of the 
downstream user. Thereafter, the downstream user receives the decision card and will then decide on how to react to 
the decision made by the upstream user. After that, the decision card will go back to the upstream user, so that he/she 
will get to know the reaction of the downstream user. Thereafter, the upstream user will decide again on water 
distribution. This exercise will be repeated several times.” 
“The upstream users (those with a triangle symbol on the ID card) are now asked to take a seat on the other side of the 
room. After everyone is seated again we will give you further instructions.”  
[Upstream and downstream users are seated back-to-back. We assure that there is sufficient space between each 
participant to guarantee privacy and to prevent copying. Once everybody is seated again, we start with the first round 
of the experiment.] 
 
Part two – Water scarcity treatment (10 rounds) 
[Distribute new production table and collect the old ones].  
“We now inform you that rainfall has dropped drastically, which results in water scarcity. This means that from now 
on the water flow has drastically decreased. Consequently, people will need more time for the same amount of water to 
flow to their plot, and thus you need more hours per day to get a good harvest and high earnings. It also means that you 
need at least 7 hours to obtain a good harvest and high earnings. All these differences are taken up in the new 
production table.” 
 
Appendix B. Social status ranking exercise 
For the social status ranking exercise, we started with explaining the participants that there may be differences among 
people with respect to social status. One’s individual social status in society might influence one’s capability to attain 
his/her needs and influence others’. ‘Hadhi ya jamii’ and ‘uwezo’ were used as Swahili translations for social status. 
‘Hadhi ya jamii’ literally means ‘status in society’. ‘Uwezo’ not only means economic ability but also the ability to 
attain what one wants, to influence others and to be respected.  The notion of power is present in the term ‘uwezo’. 
 
The concept of a hierarchy according to social status was represented by a ladder. If one is high on the ladder one has a 
high social status, low on the ladder means one is low in the social status hierarchy. An example of a ladder with four 
rungs was presented on a flipchart, indicating ‘high’ on top, and ‘low’ below16
 
.  
The participants, divided in four randomly composed mixed groups, were then asked to rank all individuals that were 
identified cultivating a plot in the irrigation scheme according to their social status. For that purpose, the names of all 
irrigation users were copied on four sets of cards, and four flipcharts with ladders were distributed. As an illustration, 
the facilitator ranked the members of the research team on the ladder on the example flipchart, attaching a hypothetical 
status to each member. After this example, the four groups separately ranked all members of the irrigation scheme by 
putting the cards of the respective farmers on the ‘social status ladder’ on the rungs matching their relative social 
status. To avoid embarrassment, overestimation or underestimation of one’s own social status, the participants were 
not expected to rank themselves. Therefore, in each group, the cards with names of the group members were put aside 
and not ranked. The research team members monitored each group to check if the exercise was well understood and if 
all understood the ‘social status’ concept as defined. They also made sure that nobody dominated the group and every 
group member could participate. When a group finished, one research team member collected the piles the group had 
put on the ladder, indicating the rung on the cards. 
 
                                                   
16 During the ranking the groups were allowed to neglect some rungs when they thought less than four categories 
where distinguishable according to social status. They were also allowed to add more rungs, i.e. categories. 
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